Women, violence and conflict in Pakistan by International Crisis Group
  
Women, 
Violence  
and Conflict  
in Pakistan 
Asia Report N°265 | 8 April 2015 
International Crisis Group 
Headquarters 
Avenue Louise 149 
1050 Brussels, Belgium 
Tel: +32 2 502 90 38 
Fax: +32 2 502 50 38 
brussels@crisisgroup.org 
  
Table of Contents  
Executive Summary ...................................................................................................................  i 
Recommendations.....................................................................................................................  iii 
I.  Introduction .....................................................................................................................  1 
II.  Institutionalised Violence against Women ......................................................................  2 
A.  Discriminatory Legislation ........................................................................................  2 
B.  The State’s Failure to Protect .....................................................................................  5 
III.  Women and the Democratic Transition ...........................................................................  8 
A.  Legislative Gains: Two Steps Forward, One Back .....................................................  8 
B.  Political Empowerment .............................................................................................  10 
IV.  Political Empowerment and Justice for Women in Conflict Zones .................................  13 
A.  Silencing Women’s Voices .........................................................................................  13 
1.  Political participation in FATA ............................................................................  13 
2.  Political participation in KPK ...............................................................................  14 
B.  Access to Justice in FATA and KPK ...........................................................................  16 
V.  Women and Armed Conflict .............................................................................................  20 
A.  Life in Conflict Zones .................................................................................................  20 
B.  Women, Peace and Security ......................................................................................  22 
VI.  Conclusion ........................................................................................................................  25 
APPENDICES 
A. Map of Pakistan ................................................................................................................  26 
B. Glossary ............................................................................................................................  27 
C. About the International Crisis Group ..............................................................................  28 
D. Crisis Group Reports and Briefings on Asia since 2012 ..................................................  29 
E. Crisis Group Board of Trustees ........................................................................................  31 
 
 
 
 
 
  
International Crisis Group  
Asia Report N°265 8 April 2015 
Executive Summary 
Eight years into its democratic transition, violence against women is still endemic in 
Pakistan, amid a climate of impunity and state inaction. Discriminatory legislation 
and a dysfunctional criminal justice system have put women at grave risk. Targeted 
by violent extremists with an overt agenda of gender repression, women’s security is 
especially threatened in the conflict zones in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) province 
and the Federally Administered Tribal Areas (FATA). On 8 March, International 
Women’s Day, Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif vowed that his government would take 
all necessary legislative and administrative steps to protect and empower women. If 
this pledge was in earnest, his Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz (PML-N) government 
should end institutionalised violence and discrimination against women, including 
by repealing unjust laws, countering extremist threats, particularly in KPK and 
FATA, and involving women and their specially relevant perspectives in design of 
state policies directly affecting their security, including strategies to deal with violent 
extremist groups.  
Women in the past were the principal victims of state policies to appease violent 
extremists. After democracy’s return, there has been some progress, particularly 
through progressive legislation, much of it authored by committed women’s rights 
activists in the federal and provincial legislatures, facilitated by their increased num-
bers in parliament. Yet, the best of laws will provide little protection so long as social 
attitudes toward women remain biased, police officers are not held accountable for 
failing to investigate gender-based crimes, the superior judiciary does not hold the 
subordinate judiciary accountable for failing to give justice to women survivors of 
violence, and discriminatory laws remain on the books.  
Laws, many remnants of General Zia-ul-Haq’s Islamisation in the 1970s and 1980s, 
continue to deny women their constitutional right to gender equality and fuel religious 
intolerance and violence against them. Their access to justice and security will remain 
elusive so long as legal and administrative barriers to political and economic empow-
erment remain, particularly the Hudood Ordinances (1979), FATA’s Frontier Crimes 
Regulations (FCR) (1901) and the Nizam-e-Adl (2009) in KPK’s Provincially Admin-
istered Tribal Areas (PATA).  
The government has a constitutional obligation and international commitments, 
including under the UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimina-
tion Against Women (CEDAW), to combat gender inequality and remove such barriers 
to women’s empowerment. Repealing discriminatory legislation and enforcing laws 
that protect women, including by ensuring that they have access to a gender-responsive 
police and courts, are essential to ending the impunity that promotes violence against 
women.  
The extent to which rights violations go unpunished is particularly alarming in 
FATA and KPK, where women are subjected to state-sanctioned discrimination, mil-
itant violence, religious extremism and sexual violence. Militants target women’s 
rights activists, political leaders and development workers without consequences. 
The prevalence of informal justice mechanisms in many parts of Pakistan, particularly 
in Pakhtunkhwa and FATA, are also highly discriminatory toward women; and the 
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government’s indiscriminate military operations, which have displaced millions, have 
further aggravated the challenges they face in the conflict zones. 
In KPK and FATA, and indeed countrywide, women’s enhanced meaningful pres-
ence in decision-making, including political participation as voters and in public office, 
will be central to sustainable reform. Pakistan should invest in their empowerment 
and reflect their priorities in all government policies, including counter-insurgency 
and peacebuilding efforts. All too often, women comprise a majority of both the in-
tended victims of the insurgency and the unintended victims of the counter-insurgency 
response.  
National and provincial legislation to enhance protections for women is a step in 
the right direction, but much more is needed to safeguard them against violence and 
injustice and ultimately to consolidate Pakistan’s democratic transition.  
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Recommendations 
To curb violence against women and promote gender equity  
To the executives and legislatures of Pakistan’s federal and  
provincial governments: 
1. Respecting international commitments and constitutionally guaranteed fundamen-
tal rights, the National Assembly should amend all laws that discriminate against 
women in the Penal Code and Evidence Act and repeal the Hudood Ordinances 
in their entirety; all provincial legislatures should pass and implement laws to 
protect and empower women, including by criminalising and taking effective 
measures to prevent domestic violence. 
2. The National Assembly should approve the Anti-Rape Laws (Criminal Laws 
Amendment) Act, the Anti-Honour Killings Laws (Criminal Laws Amendment) 
Act and the Torture, Custodial Death and Custodial Rape (Prevention and Pun-
ishment) Act, passed by the Senate in March 2015. 
3. The national legislature should establish a quota of general (directly-elected) Na-
tional Assembly seats, in addition to the existing reserved (unelected) seats, for 
women legislators, and the parliament’s rules of procedures should be amended 
to ensure a certain number of parliamentary committees are headed by women. 
4. The federal and provincial governments should prioritise the development of a 
gender-responsive security apparatus, including by increasing the numbers of 
policewomen, particularly in senior positions; building police capacity to investi-
gate crimes against women; and strengthening the National Police Bureau (NPB) 
and its gender crimes cell’s liaison with provincial authorities. 
5. The provincial governments should build the capacity of the Provincial Commis-
sions on the Status of Women (PCSW) to monitor violations of women’s rights 
and to ensure that government policies and legislation produce gender equality 
and women’s empowerment.  
To the international community, particularly the UN and  
donor countries: 
6. Continue and enhance support for developing gender-responsive policing and 
women’s rights bodies; also ensure that women’s needs, rights and priorities are 
meaningfully addressed in all aid programing. 
To protect and empower women in conflict-affected areas 
To the federal government and the Khyber Pakhtunkhwa (KPK) 
provincial government:  
7. Repeal the Frontier Crimes Regulations (FCR) in FATA and the Nizam-e-Adl in 
PATA and extend the jurisdiction of superior courts to FATA so that citizens 
there can seek protection of the fundamental rights the constitution guarantees 
them. 
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8. Include women and protect their rights and interests in counter-insurgency and 
peacebuilding strategies. 
9. Promote civilian-led and civilian-devised humanitarian assistance and take 
measures to ensure that displaced women receive timely and adequate assistance, 
including by facilitating national and international NGOs’ access to areas of dis-
placement and investigating allegations of discriminatory assistance.  
10. The federal and KPK governments should ensure that women can exercise their 
rights of franchise and to stand for public office; and the Election Commission of 
Pakistan (ECP) should investigate all cases of women having been barred from 
voting or contesting elections. 
To the international community, particularly the UN and  
donor countries: 
11. Ensure that women’s needs are adequately assessed in relief and rehabilitation 
assistance to conflict-affected and internally displaced persons.  
12. Encourage the federal government to repeal the FCR and Nizam-e-Adl and to sup-
port women’s rights in the conflict zones and participation in the development of 
counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism policies and peacebuilding efforts.  
Islamabad/Brussels, 8 April 2015 
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Women, Violence and Conflict in Pakistan 
I. Introduction 
Women’s security and their political, social and economic status in Pakistan are un-
dermined by hardened social biases, discriminatory legislation and unresponsive 
state institutions; their lives and livelihoods are also threatened by violent extrem-
ism.1 On 10 December 2014, Malala Yousafzai received the Nobel Peace Prize in Oslo 
for her promotion of girls’ education. The young activist had made global headlines 
after surviving an attack in 2012 by Mullah Fazlullah’s Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan 
(TTP-Taliban Movement of Pakistan) in the Swat district of Khyber Pakhtunkhwa 
(KPK) province three years after the military claimed to have countered militant 
threats there. Belying similar claims of success in ongoing military operations in the 
North Waziristan and Khyber agencies of the Federally Administered Tribal Areas 
(FATA), women and girls are still targeted by violent extremists. 
There is urgent need to counter gender inequity and violence against women in 
the Pashtun heartland but also throughout a country that ranks second to last in the 
World Economic Forum’s 2014 measurement of gender-based disparities in politics, 
economy, health, and education.2  
This report presents an overview of both legal frameworks that have institutional-
ised discrimination and fuelled religious intolerance and violence against women and 
a dysfunctional criminal justice system that has failed to protect them and embold-
ened extremists. It assesses progress achieved and opportunities lost since democracy 
was restored. With a special focus on FATA and KPK, where the state’s writ and the 
rule of law is fast shrinking, it discusses the potential role for women in devising state 
policies to counter violent extremism and in the prevention and resolution of con-
flict. It is based on interviews with government officials, including police, women’s 
rights activists, lawyers, NGO workers, and UN and donor representatives 
 
 
1 Crisis Group Asia Reports N°242, Pakistan: Countering Militancy in PATA, 15 January 2013; 
N°196, Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System, 6 December 2010; N°178, Pakistan: Coun-
tering Militancy in FATA, 21 October 2009; N°164, Pakistan: The Militant Jihadi Challenge, 13 
March 2009; and N°160, Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, 16 October 2008. 
2 Pakistan was 141st of the 142 countries considered; of the other South Asian countries, India came 
in at 114, Nepal at 112 and Sri Lanka at 79. “Global gender gap index 2014: Rankings”, World Eco-
nomic Forum, www.weforum.org.  
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II. Institutionalised Violence against Women 
A. Discriminatory Legislation 
Despite the 1973 constitution’s guarantee of equality for citizens regardless of gen-
der,3 legislative progress to redress the inequalities suffered by women has been un-
even at best. Islamists have repeatedly opposed the few relevant laws, and successive 
governments have been lax in implementing them. Until the mid-2000s, the 1961 
Muslim Family Laws Ordinance (MFLO, still in place) was the only substantial legis-
lation that granted women some benefits and rights in family laws. Offering a degree 
of protection for matrimonial rights, it made marriage registration compulsory and 
required local authorisation for divorce and the permission of the Arbitration Council 
for polygamous marriage.4 The 1929 Child Marriage Restraint Act, also still in place, 
sets the bar at eighteen for men and sixteen for women, except in Sindh province, 
whose Child Marriages Restraint Act (2014) raised the minimum age to eighteen for 
both.5 However, these laws will only be effective if social attitudes toward the girl 
child change. 
General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime (1977-1988) institutionalised state-sanctioned gender 
discrimination, undermining the few existing legal protections and relegating wom-
en to second-class citizens. Relying on Islamisation to legitimise military rule, Zia 
used presidential ordinances to replace part of the Pakistan Penal Code with Islamic 
jurisprudence and punishments.6 The Hudood Ordinances criminalised all consen-
sual sexual intercourse between adults outside marriage; female minors could also be 
charged with zina (extramarital sexual intercourse) if the age of puberty was reached. 
Till then, only adultery had been illegal, although a female accused of adultery was 
not punished under the law.7 
Punishments under the Hudood Ordinances were divided between Hadd (Quranic) 
and Tazir (non-Quranic). If there was insufficient proof for Hadd – four adult Mus-
lim witnesses, “truthful persons [who] abstain from major sins” – the accused was 
still liable to Tazir. In rape (zina bil jabr) and zina cases, the Hadd punishment was 
stoning to death if the offender was married and mandatory public flogging if 
unmarried.8  
 
 
3 “All citizens are equal before law and are entitled to equal protection of law … there shall be no 
discrimination on the basis of sex … nothing in this Article shall prevent the State from making any 
special provision for the protection of women and children” (Article 25); and “steps shall be taken 
to ensure full participation of women in all spheres of national life” (Article 34).  
4 Under Islamic law, a man can contract four marriages provided the wife or wives approve. 
5 Muslim Family Law Ordinance, 1961; “Sindh assembly passes bill declaring marriage under 18 
punishable by law”, The Express Tribune, 28 April 2014. On 6 March 2015, the Punjab assembly 
amended the 1929 Child Marriage Act, providing stricter punishments for those involved in arrang-
ing such unions but retained sixteen as the legal age for girls. “Punjab approves stricter Child Mar-
riage Restraint Act”, The News, 6 March 2015. 
6 Promulgated on 9 February 1979, the ordinances were Offences Against Property (enforcement of 
Hudood) Ordinance; Prohibition (enforcement of Hadd) Order; Offence of Qazf (enforcement of 
Hadd) Ordinance”; Offence of Zina (enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance; and Execution of Pun-
ishment by Whipping Ordinance. Hudood is the plural of Hadd, a limit or prohibition, and refers to 
offences for which a punishment is specified under Islamic law. 
7 Asma Jahangir and Hina Jilani, The Hudood Ordinances: A Divine Sanction? (Lahore, 2003), 
pp.85-86. Asma Jahangir is a member of the Crisis Group Board of Trustees.  
8 “Offence of Zina (enforcement of Hudood) Ordinance, 1979”, Section 8. 
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The evidentiary requirements under the Hadood Ordinances for the imposition 
of Hadd (the most extreme punishment) do not accept the testimony of women. Al-
though Hadd punishment has never been executed, the law severely undermines the 
value of a female’s testimony. The 1984 Qanoon-e-Shahadat (the law of evidence) also 
discriminates against women.9 Until the law was amended (discussed below), to file 
a complaint of rape was risky; confessed extramarital sexual intercourse by the victim 
could be determined to have taken place with her consent and the complaint convert-
ed to an accusation of zina under which the victim of rape was herself prosecuted.  
The zina ordinance lent itself to massive abuse, with thousands imprisoned for mar-
rying against family will, seeking divorce, escaping domestic abuse or being raped.10 
“Victims of rape have been placed in a snare. Silence is as risky as making a complaint”, 
since it could be used against the victim as admission of illegal sexual intercourse.11 
By 1988, nearly half of all women in prison were accused of zina.12  
The women’s movement emerged in reaction to Zia’s Islamisation, particularly the 
Hudood Ordinances. In 1981, Shirkat Gah, a women’s collective, helped to launch 
the Women’s Action Forum (WAF), an umbrella group of women’s rights activists 
and organisations. Its demonstrators against the evidence law were threatened, 
attacked and arrested.13 After Zia’s 1988 death and the restoration of democracy, 
women and other prominent rights groups, particularly the independent Human 
Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), played a major role in lobbying against dis-
criminatory legislation and for greater gender equality. 
Democracy’s return presented opportunities for women’s rights, particularly after 
the 1988 elections brought to power the left-of-centre Pakistan Peoples Party (PPP) 
of Benazir Bhutto, the first female prime minister of a Muslim country. Despite mili-
tary and Islamist party pushback, a number of steps were taken in her first tenure 
(December 1988-August 1990) to undo some of the harm done by the Zia regime, in-
cluding freeing all women charged under the Hudood Ordinances.14 Yet, lacking a 
stable parliamentary majority and ousted by a military-devised intervention before it 
completed even a second year in office, the government failed to reverse Zia’s discrim-
inatory laws. In its second tenure (October 1993-November 1996), it acceded to the 
UN Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination Against Women 
 
 
9 The testimony of two women became equal to a man’s. In financial matters, two men or a man and 
two women were required to attest a document. Qanun-e-Shahadat, 1984, Chapter 2, Section 17. 
Rubya Mehdi, The Islamisation of the Law in Pakistan (Richmond, 1994), p. 149.  
10 Khawar Mumtaz and Farida Shaheed, Women of Pakistan: Two Steps Forward, One Step Back 
(London, 1987). Crisis Group interviews, women’s rights activists, Islamabad, November-December 
2014.  
11 Jahangir and Jilani, op. cit., p. 88. In 1983, the court used the pregnancy of Safia Bibi, a blind 
eighteen-year-old raped by her landlord and his son, to convict her of unlawful sexual intercourse, 
while freeing the men for lack of evidence. Public outcry in part led the Federal Shariat (Islamic 
Law) Court (FSC) to reverse the lower court judgement in 1985. Mumtaz and Shaheed, op. cit., pp. 
103-104. Established by the Zia regime in 1980, the FSC reviews legislation to ensure accordance 
with Islamic injunctions. For analysis of its functioning and rulings, see Crisis Group Report, 
Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, op. cit.  
12 Asma Jahangir, “What the Protection of Women Act does and what is left undone”, in “State of 
Human Rights in 2006”, Human Rights Commission of Pakistan (HRCP), January 2006.  
13 Mumtaz and Shaheed, op. cit., pp. 106-107.  
14 Suad Joseph and Afsaneh Najmabadi, Encyclopaedia of Women and Islamic Culture: Family, 
Law and Politics (Leiden, 2003), p. 83. 
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(CEDAW) and passed the Women in Distress and Detention Fund Act to provide 
financial and legal assistance to women in need.15 
The flawed democratic transition of the 1990s, in which governments were dis-
missed through military-engineered interventions before completing full terms, saw 
further institutional curbs on women’s rights and freedoms. In the three-month inter-
im between dismissal of Bhutto’s first government and installation of Nawaz Sharif’s 
Muslim League (Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, PML-N) government, President 
Ghulam Ishaq Khan, who had been Zia’s finance minister and then chairman of his 
rubber stamp Senate (upper house), promulgated the qisas (retribution) and diyat 
(monetary compensation/bloody money) ordinance. It allowed a victim’s heir (wali) 
to pardon a killer in return for compensation, thus legitimising (even encouraging) 
murder, particularly “honour killings” of women.16 Since most “honour” crimes are 
committed within the family, the victim’s relatives often forgive the perpetrator 
under the diyat provision.17 Instead of addressing such legal distortions, the new 
government made the ordinance part of the Pakistan Penal Code in 1997.18 
General Pervez Musharraf, who overthrew Nawaz Sharif’s government in October 
1999, promised to end religious extremism and promote “enlightened moderation”.19 
Yet, dependent on Islamist parties to counter his moderate political opposition, his 
regime did not reverse Zia’s discriminatory laws.20 It did set up the National Commis-
sion on the Status of Women (NCSW) in 2000 but did not act on its recommenda-
tion to repeal the Hudood Ordinances.21 In 2006, civil society successfully lobbied 
parliament to pass the Protection of Women Act (PWA), returning rape from those 
ordinances to the Penal Code.  
By separating zina from zina-bil-jabr, the PWA prevented rape charges from be-
ing converted into charges of extramarital sexual intercourse.22 Filing a complaint 
against rape was no longer risky.23 However, the amended Hudood Ordinances re-
tained “the roots of religious extremism” and discrimination by still criminalising 
 
 
15 Among other provisions, CEDAW binds signatory states to promote gender equality “in their le-
gal system, abolish all discriminatory laws, and adopt appropriate ones prohibiting discrimination 
against women”. Text at www.un.og/womenwatch/daw/cedaw/cedaw.htm. “Women in Distress 
and Detention Fund Act”, National Assembly Secretariat, Islamabad, 15 October 1996. 
16 Maliha Zia Lari, “A pilot study on ‘honour killings’ in Pakistan and compliance with law”, Aurat 
Foundation, November 2011; Mumtaz and Shaheed, op. cit., pp. 110-111.  
17 “State of Human Rights in 2013”, HRCP, March 2014, p. 180; Neha Ali Gauhar, “Honour crimes 
in Pakistan: Unveiling reality and perception”, Community Appraisal and Motivation Program 
(CAMP), 2014. 
18 “Crime or custom? Violence against women in Pakistan”, Human Rights Watch, August 1999, 
p. 25. 
19 Musharraf’s “strategy of enlightened moderation”, in his words, called for countering violent ex-
tremism through “poverty alleviation, education, health and social justice”. Justice, he wrote, “must 
be done and seen to be done”. Pervez Musharraf, “Islam and West: Time for enlightened modera-
tion”, The Khaleej Times, 2 June 2014. 
20 Crisis Group Asia Reports N°49, Pakistan: the Mullahs and the Military, 20 March 2003; and 
N°73, Unfulfilled Promises: Pakistan’s Failure to Tackle Extremism, 16 January 2004. 
21 Crisis Group Report, Reforming the Judiciary in Pakistan, op. cit. Some provisions were revised. 
22 “Struggle for justice”, Dawn, 12 February 2015.  
23 In 2010, the FSC ruled that sections of the PWA violated Islamic provisions because they “an-
nulled the overriding effect of the Hudood Ordinances”. “Protection of Women (criminal law amend-
ment) Act, 2006”, Government of Pakistan, December 2006; text of Federal Shariat Court ruling, 
2010, at www.federalshariatcourt.gov.pk. 
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zina and allowing testimony only by Muslim males in Hadd cases, reinforcing “the 
impression that women and non-Muslims are inferior citizens”.24 
Musharraf’s Legal Framework Order (LFO)25 set a 17 per cent quota for women in 
the Senate, National Assembly (lower house) and provincial assemblies, considera-
bly increasing their numbers.26 With the exception of the PWA, however, this did not 
immediately translate into more pro-women laws. Indeed, the regime’s support for 
Islamist political parties led to reinforced state-sanctioned gender discrimination.27  
In 2003, the MMA-controlled NWFP legislature passed a law declaring Sharia 
the province’s supreme law and empowering its government to set up commissions 
to examine ways to Islamise education, the economy and legal system. In 2005, it 
passed the Hisba bill – eventually struck down by the Supreme Court – to ensure en-
forcement of Islamic codes of conduct.28 While the military’s peace deals following 
failed operations in FATA allowed violent extremists to further expand their influence 
in the tribal belt, the MMA’s political clout resulted in the unregulated expansion of 
jihadi madrasas in both NWFP and Balochistan, further undermining women’s secu-
rity in the Pashtun heartland.29  
Musharraf’s ouster, the restoration of democracy and elections in 2008 and 2013 
marginalised the Islamist parties and brought first the centre-left PPP and then the 
centre-right PML-N to power. Democracy’s return raised hopes that the state would 
proactively protect and empower women. Yet, progress on women’s laws and protec-
tions has been limited.  
B. The State’s Failure to Protect 
Parliament’s unwillingness to repeal or even reform discriminatory laws, the absence 
of a national domestic violence law and a gender-insensitive, dysfunctional criminal 
justice system are significant factors in the state’s failure to protect women from en-
 
 
24 Jahangir, op. cit. A woman still cannot give evidence in Hadd cases, and the accused must be a 
non-Muslim for the testimony of non-Muslims to be accepted.  
25 The LFO was primarily aimed at regime consolidation, expanding presidential powers and tilting 
the political playing field toward Musharraf’s civilian proxies and allies. “Legal Framework Order 
2002”, August 2002. Crisis Group Asia Reports Nº40, Pakistan: Transition to Democracy?, 3 Oc-
tober 2002; and N°102, Authoritarianism and Political Party Reform in Pakistan, 28 September 
2005. 
26 This quota was for “reserved” seats, allocated to political parties in proportion to their total directly-
elected “general” seats in the federal and provincial parliaments. Article 51, constitution of Paki-
stan. After the quota was introduced, the percentage of women in the federal parliament increased 
from 2.3 to 22.5 per cent. Muhammad Rashid Mahfooz Zaka, “Gender Equality and Women’s Em-
powerment in Parliament”, in “Gender, Peace and Conflict Research in Pakistan”, Journal of Peace, 
Conflict and Development, no. 19, December 2012, p. 20. 
27 The rigged 2002 elections produced a Muttahida Majlis-e-Amal (MMA) government in KPK (then 
Northwest Frontier Province, NWFP) and a coalition government with Musharraf’s Muslim League 
(Muslim League – Quaid-i-Azam – PML-Q) in Balochistan. The MMA was a six-party Islamist alli-
ance. Crisis Group Reports, Mullahs and the Military; and Appeasing the Militants, both op. cit. 
28 Crisis Groups Report, The Militant Jihadi Challenge, op. cit. 
29 Propagating religious and sectarian hatred, jihadi madrasas have flourished, filling the gaps of a 
dilapidated public education sector and providing an endless stream of recruits to extremist organi-
sations. Crisis Group Asia Reports Nº257, Education Reform in Pakistan, 23 June 2014; Nº95, The 
State of Sectarianism in Pakistan, 18 April 2005; Nº84, Pakistan: Reforming the Education Sec-
tor, 7 October 2004; and Nº36, Pakistan: Madrasas, Extremism and the Military, 29 July 2002. 
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demic violence. According to the latest Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey, 39 
per cent of fifteen- to 49-year-old married women have been physically or emotion-
ally abused by their spouse; one in ten women experienced violence during a preg-
nancy; and 52 per cent of women who experienced violence kept it secret.30 In 2014, 
according to the HRCP, 232 women suffered acid attacks or were burned, the major-
ity by someone they knew; 859 committed suicide, often due to domestic abuse; and 
461 were killed by their husbands.31 In 2014, 898 were victims of “honour killings”.32 
Because the law protects those responsible, women are murdered with impunity by 
family or community members for reasons ranging from marrying for choice, finan-
cial motives or being raped.  
The dysfunctional criminal justice system, compounded by lack of gender respon-
siveness, ensures that perpetrators are seldom held accountable.33 Few survivors of 
gender-based violence go to the police; when they do, many cases are not even regis-
tered. Female complainants are often dismissed or put in harm’s way by officers try-
ing to mediate, and some officers have assaulted a complainant.34 The police are ill-
equipped to handle gender-violence cases, particularly due to inadequate numbers 
of women officers, but simply raising numbers would be insufficient unless accom-
panied by enhanced authority, training and stringent oversight, since there are insti-
tutional biases to be overcome, and policewomen have also been known to commit 
abuses. There is also urgent need to improve the entire force’s technical capacity.35  
Evidence collection, currently “a male-dominated area”, is particularly poor.36 Time-
ly medical examinations in rape cases are seldom conducted, resulting in weak court 
cases and poor conviction rates. Of the 14,580 cases registered between 2009 and late 
2014 nationally, only 949 (6.5 per cent), led to convictions. In Sindh, 38 (3.5 per 
cent) of 1,077 cases and in the federal capital Islamabad one of 90 led to convictions.37  
While investigation and prosecution agencies are poorly equipped and trained to 
build strong criminal cases, judicial bias also sometimes leads to verdicts that penal-
ise women. “While researching on knowledge, attitudes and practices on rape, I was 
shocked to hear a [lower court] judge in Punjab say that if it was a gang rape, it could 
 
 
30 “2012-13 Pakistan Demographic and Health Survey”, National Institute of Population Studies, 
December 2013, p. 219. The findings do not include FATA. 
31 Figures given to Crisis Group by HRCP, Lahore, February 2015. Between 2007 and March 2014, 
more than 1,000 acid-attack cases were reported, overwhelmingly on women and children. Acid 
Survivors Foundation (a Pakistani NGO founded in 2006), acidsurvivorspakistan.org. 
32 Data provided to Crisis Group by HRCP, Lahore, February 2015. 
33 Police apathy over violence against women, often seen as internal family matters, was apparent 
when officers looked on as a young pregnant woman, married of her free will, was stoned to death 
by male family members in front of the Lahore High Court. In November 2014, that court gave the 
death penalty to her father, a brother, a cousin and the man chosen by the family to marry her. 
“Woman stoned to death outside Lahore High Court”, Reuters, 27 May 2014; “LHC announces 
death penalty for Farzana’s murderers”, Dawn, 19 November 2014.  
34 In May 2010, female officers in a Punjab police station brutally beat a woman in an attack caught 
on video but were acquitted because the victim denied the incident, presumably under pressure. 
Crisis Group Report, Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal Justice System, op. cit. 
35 Crisis Group Asia Report, Nº157, Reforming Pakistan’s Police, 14 July 2008. 
36 Crisis Group interview, Ihsan Ghani, director general, National Police Bureau, Islamabad, 17 
September 2014.  
37 “Seeking justice: only one rape conviction in the last five years”, The Express Tribune, 9 Novem-
ber 2014. 
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be considered zina-bil-jaber (rape). But if there was only one aggressor, then it was 
zina (consensual extramarital sex)”, a gender expert said.38 
Some efforts are being made to improve performance on gender-based violence. 
The National Police Bureau (NPB), an umbrella body tasked with implementing re-
form and monitoring progress, created a gender crime cell to document crimes 
against women and advise provinces on standard procedures to deal with victims of 
gender-based violence and investigate violent crimes against women.39 It has also, as 
part of a German government-funded Gender Responsive Policing project, drawn up 
a strategy that includes training and more policewomen.40 While the heads of all pro-
vincial police endorse the strategy, interactions with the NPB and most importantly 
NPB capacity to influence policy remain limited.41  
Since 2006, the National Police Academy’s curriculum includes a training mod-
ule developed by Rozan, an Islamabad-based NGO, to increase police sensitivity to 
women’s rights and needs, and a training manual for investigation officers on inter-
viewing women and child survivors of violence.42 Sensitising will, however, be insuf-
ficient if officers are not held accountable for failing to investigate the crimes, the 
superior judiciary does not hold the subordinate judiciary accountable for failing to 
give justice to women survivors of violence, and discriminatory laws stay on the books. 
The onus rests on elected governments and parliaments to ensure that women’s 
security is not sacrificed to political expediency. 
 
 
38 Crisis Group interview, Naghma Imdad, Islamabad, 6 February 2015.  
39 Crisis Group interview, Ihsan Ghani director general, NPB, Islamabad, 17 September 2014. 
“Standard operating procedures for police for dealing with women and investigating crimes of vio-
lence against women”, NPB, interior ministry, November 2008. 
40 “Equality in perspective – gender strategy of police 2012-2016”, Gender Responsive Policing Pro-
ject and NPB, 2012. 
41 “Since the Police Order 2002, we should have held 24 biannual board meetings, but we’ve only 
held seven. The bureau lay dormant for years, losing relevance in the eyes of the political leader-
ship”, its current head said. Crisis Group interview, Ihsan Ghani, director general, NPB, Islamabad, 
17 September 2014. On Police Order 2002, see Crisis Group Report, Reforming Pakistan’s Police, 
op. cit.  
42 Crisis Group interview, Sayyed Safi Peerzada, coordinator, Rozan’s Rabta (contact) police program, 
Islamabad, 12 December 2014. Created in 1998, Rozan focuses on countering violence against 
women and children, especially psychological and sexual abuse. 
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III. Women and the Democratic Transition 
A. Legislative Gains: Two Steps Forward, One Back 
Eight years into the democratic transition, there has been some progress in empow-
ering and protecting women, particularly via progressive legislation.43 The appointment 
of Dr Fehmida Mirza in 2008 as the first woman to hold the highest post – speaker – 
in the national legislature “contributed immensely to promoting a women-friendly 
and gender-sensitive political culture [in parliament]”.44 The formation of the cross-
party-lines Women’s Parliamentary Caucus (WPC) in 2009 with UN Development 
Programme (UNDP) aid was particularly significant. United for a common cause 
and helped by rights activists in researching and drafting bills, women parliamentar-
ians achieved a number of pro-women laws.45 “The caucus is a watershed. This is the 
first of its kind in Pakistan’s political history”, said the WPC secretary Syed Shamoon 
Hashmi, who called it “a mechanism that has enabled quantitative and qualitative 
input for women in the proceedings of the House”.46  
The 2012 National Commission on the Status of Women (NCSW) Act transformed 
that commission into a powerful and autonomous body. The status of the chair, 
appointed by the prime minister in agreement with the opposition leader, is equiva-
lent to that of a minister of state. The NCSW is tasked with reviewing government 
policies and legislation to ensure gender equality and women’s empowerment. It can 
investigate violations with “the powers vested in a civil court … for enforcing the 
attendance of any person and compelling the production of documents”.47 The chair 
also is to sit on the Pakistan National Commission for Human Rights (PNCHR), which, 
however, almost three years after it was established, is yet to be formed. In February 
2015, the government finally appointed its members, but it will begin to function 
only after the president approves its composition.48  
In 2010, the PPP-led parliament passed the Protection against Harassment of 
Women at the Workplace Act, with complaint mechanism, inquiry procedure and 
penalties to improve working-women’s conditions and increase their presence in the 
labour force; and the Criminal Law (amendment) Act inserted sexual harassment 
into the Penal Code. The 2011 Prevention of Anti-Women Practices Act bars forced 
marriages, marriages to the Quran, giving away women in vani or swara or depriv-
ing them of inheritance,49 and provincial governments from suspending, remitting or 
 
 
43 Crisis Group Asia Report N°249, Parliament’s Role in Pakistan’s Democratic Transition, 18 Sep-
tember 2013. 
44 Naeem Mirza, “Seven pro-women laws in seven years”, Legislative Watch, Aurat Publication and 
Information Service Foundation, Newsletter Issue no. 38, December 2011. Aurat Foundation, creat-
ed in 1986, is an Islamabad-based NGO with a focus on women’s empowerment. A women’s rights 
activist noted that “women were finally experiencing power in the House”. Crisis Group interview, 
Marvi Sirmed, Islamabad, 6 November 2014. 
45 Of eighteen private member bills in the 2008-2012 parliament, twelve were introduced by wom-
en. Zaka, op. cit., p. 28. 
46 Crisis Group interview, Syed Shamoon Hashmi, Islamabad, 25 September 2014. 
47 “National Commission on the Status of Women Act, 2012”, NCSW, www.ncsw.gov.pk. 
48 National Commission for Human Rights Act, 2012; “Rights commission set up, to become opera-
tional soon”, Dawn, 14 February 2015.  
49 Giving away women, mainly minors, to settle disputes is vani in Punjabi, swara in Pashtu. Mar-
rying to the Quran is usually to keep a woman’s inheritance in the family.  
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commuting punishments in rape cases. A women’s rights NGO noted: “The biggest 
success … of this legislation” was acceptance that “crimes committed against women 
under the guise of ‘customary practices’ are in actuality crimes”.50 Also in 2011, the 
Criminal Law (second amendment) Act, made attacks with a substance such as acid 
punishable from fourteen years to life imprisonment and a minimum million rupee 
(nearly $10,000) fine.51 Reporting of attacks and registration of such cases has in-
creased, and sentences have become harsher.52 
The failure of some provincial governments to follow the federal lead, however, 
has hampered justice delivery, particularly since responsibilities of the federal wom-
en’s affairs ministry were devolved to the provinces under the eighteenth constitu-
tional amendment (2010).53 Unlike Sindh and Punjab, Balochistan and KPK have yet 
to appoint ombudspersons to deal with workplace harassment.54 The PML-N, despite 
a comfortable federal parliament majority, has not championed women’s rights.55 
PPP opposition parliamentarians are mainly responsible for introducing private 
member bills to enhance protection for women.56  
One such private member bill, endorsed by the Senate standing committee on law 
and justice in January 2015, would preclude any out-of-court blood-money settle-
ment for honour killings. In February, that committee endorsed a bill that, inter alia, 
would make use of DNA evidence standard in rape cases, tighten checks on medical-
legal officers, enhance punishments, require courts to decide the cases within six 
months and prohibit judges from considering the victim’s character. In January 
2015, the Senate standing interior committee endorsed a bill to require a life impris-
onment sentence and three million rupee fine (nearly $30,000 for custodial death 
or rape and prohibit women being taken into custody by male security personnel or 
 
 
50 Maliha Zia Lari, “A critical appreciation of the Prevention of Anti-Women Practices (Criminal 
Law amendment) Bill 2011”, Legislative Watch, Aurat Publication and Information Service Founda-
tion, Newsletter Issue no. 37, August-mid-November 2011.  
51 In the 232 cases of violent attacks on women in 2014, acid was used in 92, fire in 67. Data shared 
by HRCP with Crisis Group, February 2015. 
52 Before 2011, the average sentence was six to ten years of imprisonment; in 2013 it was twenty 
years. Caroline Bates and Valerie Khan, “Acid Violence – Fostering effective implementation of pro-
women and girls laws: Criminal Law Amendment Act 2011 (Act XXV) – an example of good prac-
tice”, Acid Survivors Foundation, April 2014.  
53 Removing the distortions of military rule and restoring federal parliamentary democracy, the 
eighteenth constitutional amendment devolved significant power from the centre to the provinces, 
addressing a longstanding faultline that had largely contributed to the country’s dismemberment in 
1971. Crisis Group Report, Parliament’s Role in Pakistan’s Democratic Transition, op. cit.  
54 “Pro-women legislation”, Dawn, 15 November 2014. The federal ombudsman secretariat has 
proposed amending the law to clarify the definition of “workplace” to include home-based workers 
and students in educational institutions; extend its application to men facing harassment at the 
workplace; and give the secretariat power to act on its own initiative (suo moto). “Anti-harassment 
law needs teeth”, The Nation, 23 February 2015. 
55 See, for instance, “Pakistan Vision 2025”, the PML-N government’s long-term plan to promote hu-
man, social and economic development. Planning, development and reform ministry, www.pc.gov.pk. 
Also, “Parties vow to improve women’s status”, The News, 30 September 2014. 
56 The opposition-controlled Senate has passed three such bills. “Senate approves criminal laws, 
Privatisation Commission amendment bills”, The News, 3 March 2015. The PML-N government’s 
commitment will be judged when the lower house votes on the bills. 
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detained by law enforcement or intelligence agencies to obtain information about an 
alleged criminal.57  
While passage of these bills would be positive, the Hudood Ordinances would 
continue to undermine women’s rights. So long as consensual extramarital sexual 
intercourse is a criminal offence, use of DNA evidence could even endanger women: 
“If an unmarried woman gets pregnant, she might claim she was raped [to avoid a 
charge of zina], but she won’t want her partner to be punished. With a DNA test, the 
father’s identity would be known; they would both end up in jail”.58 
The moderate parties’ apparent unwillingness to repeal or revise laws justified by 
Islamists on religious grounds is largely responsible for the Hudood Ordinances’ reten-
tion. Islamist opposition also caused the Domestic Violence Bill (2009) to fail, because 
it was not introduced in the Senate within three months after National Assembly 
passage. A leader of the largest Islamist party, JUI-F (Jamiat Ulema-e-Islam-Fazlur 
Rehman), and chair of the Council of Islamic Ideology, Senator Maulana Mohammad 
Khan Shehrani, said, “we oppose this law because it is not the solution; rather it is a 
possible cause of more chaos in society”.59  
Though there is no national law against domestic violence, some progress has been 
made in the provinces. Balochistan passed such a law in 2014; Sindh did so in 2013 
but has yet to follow up with rules and protection committees.60 Punjab appears about 
to adopt a bill, a ruling party legislator said, but in KPK, an opposition politician said, 
one was still “stuck with the law department”.61 
B. Political Empowerment 
The Election Laws (Amendment) Act 2011 made voter registration contingent on pos-
session of a computerised national identity card (CNIC) issued by the National Data-
base and Registration Authority (NADRA). With CNIC issuance to women a priority, 
electoral rolls included 86 per cent of eligible women voters in 2012, compared to 50 
per cent in 2008.62 The increase can also partly be explained by the Benazir Income 
Support Program (BISP), a national social safety measure the PPP government 
launched in 2008. It gives a monthly stipend to female heads of household subsist-
ing on less than 6,000 rupees (around $60) a month. A CNIC is required for BISP 
 
 
57 Crisis Group interview, Senator Sughra Imam (who introduced the first two bills), 11 March 2015. 
Senator Farhatullah Babar introduced the third. “The fight against rape”, The Express Tribune, 24 
January 2015; “Senate body adopts two bills on honour killing, rape”, The Nation, 22 January 2015. 
“Senate panel okays bill seeking life term for custodial killing”, Dawn, 22 January 2015.  
58 Crisis Group interview, Asma Jahangir, Supreme Court Bar Association president and prominent 
human rights lawyer, Lahore, 13 February 2015.  
59 “Pakistan edges close to domestic violence bill”, Daily Times, 9 April 2010; “Two women abused 
an hour in Pakistan”, The Express Tribune, 2 August 2010. The Council of Islamic Ideology is con-
stitutionally mandated to advise the legislature on the conformity of laws to Islamic injunctions. Its 
website is www.cii.gov.pk.  
60 “Coordinated efforts stressed for effective implementation of Domestic Violence Act”, press 
release, NCSW, 17 December 2014; “Sindh passes domestic violence bill”, The Express Tribune, 
8 March 2013.  
61 “International women’s day: Events highlight women’s achievements, issues”, The News, 9 March 
2015.  
62 “Pakistan votes”, NADRA and ECP, Government of Pakistan, April 2013, p. 31; Tariq Malik, 
“Technology in the service of development: the NADRA story”, Center for Global Development, No-
vember 2014. Malik was the former NADRA chairperson.  
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registration.63 Women voters in FATA and KPK, where female mobility is most re-
stricted, also increased because of the displacement of hundreds of thousands from 
inaccessible and insecure areas to urban centres and relief camps due to militant vio-
lence, military operations and floods.64 A CNIC is needed to register as a displaced 
person and so gain access to resulting goods and services. Women who obtain them 
become eligible voters.65 
It remains a challenge, however, for women to win elections. Only eight won direct 
seats in 2013, ten fewer than in the 2008 National Assembly polls.66 Had there been 
no reserved seats, female presence in the national legislature would have been mini-
mal. Yet, because women in reserved seats lack a constituency, they often find it diffi-
cult to obtain the support of their parties and male colleagues. Some will only intro-
duce a bill co-sponsored by influential men. Nevertheless, women elected to reserved 
seats have been responsible for initiating some of the most progressive legislation, 
including several of the bills discussed above. If the National Assembly and Senate 
rules of procedure are amended to allocate chairs of some key committees to women, 
their policy role would be strengthened and parties given incentive to choose strong 
women candidates. 
Some parties seek to improve the direct-election chances for their women mem-
bers. The ANP has awarded reserved seats to women from constituencies it narrowly 
lost so they can build a voter base for a future election.67 A pending private-member 
National Assembly bill introduced by PPP women in 2013 would make it mandatory 
for parties to award women at least 10 per cent of their general seat tickets.68 Though 
the National Assembly standing committee on parliamentary affairs approved the 
bill in November 2014, a co-sponsor said there is little buy-in beyond the PPP.69  
Even if the bill becomes law, parties could still give women tickets to contest only 
constituencies they were unlikely to win.70 This could be avoided by allocating a quota 
of general seats for women, so that the most reluctant parties would have to nomi-
nate female candidates or lose seats in parliament. Rights activists have long sought 
 
 
63 Initially Rs. 1,000 ($10-$11), the stipend was increased in 2014 to Rs. 1,500 ($15). By late 2014, 
4.7 million households were benefitting. BISP website at www.bisp.gov.pk. 
64 Crisis Group Asia Reports, N°237, Pakistan: No End to Humanitarian Crises, 9 October 2012; 
N°227, Aid and Conflict in Pakistan, 27 June 2012; and Briefings, N°111, Pakistan: The Worsening 
IDP Crisis, 16 September 2010; and N°93, Pakistan’s IDP Crisis: Challenges and Opportunities, 
3 June 2009. 
65 “Voices from FATA – Women in FATA elections 2013”, Community Appraisal and Motivation 
Programme (CAMP), May-June 2013.  
66 Election Commission of Pakistan (ECP) website, www.ecp.pk.  
67 Crisis Group interview, Bushra Gohar, ANP senior vice president, Islamabad, 1 December 2014. 
68 Political Parties Order (Amendment) Bill, 2013, private members (Nafisa Shah and Azra Pechuho) 
draft. 
69 “Parties don’t want to be seen against it, but no one’s going to push for it, and that’s why it has 
still not been subject to a vote in the House. If this law doesn’t pass, we will have to look into other 
measures for women to build electoral constituencies”. Crisis Group telephone interview, Nafisa Shah, 
18 February 2015. Her co-sponsor, Pechuho, is former president and PPP leader Asif Ali Zardari’s 
sister, indicating high-level party support.  
70 “Empowering women for stronger political parties – a good practices guide to promote women’s 
political participation”, UNDP and National Democratic Institute, October 2011, pp. 22-27. 
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a 33 per cent minimum quota in the National Assembly, to create a “critical mass” to 
influence male counterparts and produce change.71 
The pending bill discussed above would also require parties to ensure a 33 per cent 
minimum quota in elected general councils and committees. However, quotas would 
be challenging. A gender expert and women’s rights activist cautioned: 
All these measures, including reserved seats, are a means to an end until such af-
firmative action is no longer needed …. Raising women’s presence in the political 
realm will not necessarily lead to greater gender equity without supporting wom-
en’s right to franchise so that women voters are no longer considered marginal, 
and women and men vying for their support can then be elected on a pro-women 
agenda.72 
As noted, the eighteenth constitutional amendment devolved subjects from the fed-
eral women’s affairs ministry to the provinces. The Provincial Commissions for the 
Status of Women (PCSWs) are mandated to review provincial legislation and policies 
to promote empowerment, ensure gender equality and counter discrimination. Pun-
jab’s PCSW can also exercise civil-court powers to investigate complaints.73 With 
access to grassroots networks, the PCSWs could respond faster to abuses than the 
NCSW. But provincial response has been uneven. Balochistan still lacks a PCSW; the 
bill to establish one in Sindh was introduced only in March. Where PCSWs have been 
formed (Punjab and KPK), they lack sufficient resources and political backing to ful-
fil their mandate.74  
This deficiency is particularly evident in KPK. Its PCSW, established in 2009, still 
has inadequate staff and political support. A member said, “as a women’s body, we are 
not taken seriously, neither by the previous [KPK] government, nor the present one”.75 
Unlike Punjab’s PCSW, formed in 2014 as an autonomous body,76 KPK’s operates 
under the provincial social welfare, education and women empowerment ministry. 
Though the ministry has been generally supportive, its ability to influence govern-
ment policy is limited: its head has been reduced from status of minister to that of 
special assistant to the chief minister.77 
Women activists are concerned that even rights gained could be undermined in 
KPK, where the Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf (PTI) is in coalition with Jamaat-i-Islami 
(JI). The previous ANP-led government passed important pro-women laws, such as 
one in 2011 to protect property inheritance rights. The PTI-JI alliance seems to have 
little interest in such actions. A woman PTI member in the province said, “I com-
pletely dissociate myself from the party when it comes to women’s issues”.78 Yet, 
women are the worst affected by conflict in KPK and neighbouring FATA and most 
in need of protection and empowerment.  
 
 
71 Crisis Group interviews, rights activists, NGO and political party workers, Islamabad, Peshawar, 
Lahore, July 2014-February 2015. 
72 Crisis Group interview, Islamabad, 15 February 2015. 
73 The Punjab Commission on the Status of Women Act 2014.  
74 “We [and PCSWs] do not have enough resources to deal with the impact of conflict on women”. 
Crisis Group interview, Khawar Mumtaz, NCSW chair, Islamabad, 19 December 2014. 
75 Crisis Group interview, Peshawar, September 2014. 
76 Punjab Commission on the Status of Women Act 2014. 
77 Crisis Group interviews, PCSW members, Peshawar, July 2014. 
78 Crisis Group interview, Peshawar, September 2014.  
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IV. Political Empowerment and Justice for  
Women in Conflict Zones  
A. Silencing Women’s Voices 
1. Political participation in FATA 
Even the few laws that protect women do not extend to FATA.79 An administrative 
and legal framework, codified in the 1901 colonial Frontier Crimes Regulations 
(FCR), denies its citizens in FATA constitutionally guaranteed fundamental rights and 
impartial justice.80 Following the latest attempt to reform the FCR, then President 
Zardari’s August 2011 reform package, women and children under sixteen can no 
longer be detained under the FCR’s collective responsibility clause, which empowers 
an agency’s top bureaucrat, the political agent, to arrest family members (even an 
entire tribe) for crimes committed by an individual.81 Yet, women still suffer indirectly 
from the collective and preventative detention clauses when husbands and older sons, 
usually the sole wage earners, are detained.  
FCR also denies FATA residents political rights enjoyed by all other citizens. Adult 
franchise was granted only in 1996 by Benazir Bhutto’s government. Political party 
activity was curtailed until August 2011, when her widower, President Zardari, ex-
tended the Political Parties Order (2002) to the region. Yet, FATA parliamentarians, 
who have been directly elected to the National Assembly since 1997, still cannot leg-
islate on FATA.82 
Even the limited political freedoms, such as franchise, are under attack by violent 
extremists, with women often the prime targets. In the 2008 elections, militants pre-
vented a third of FATA women from voting.83 In Khyber agency, the radical Sunni 
Lashkar-e-Islami intimidated local officials, candidates and the electorate, especially 
women, who were “banned” from voting.84 In South Waziristan agency, elections 
were not held due to the deteriorating security environment. When polls did take 
place in the conflict-hit agency in 2013, the 11.37 per cent turnout was the lowest in 
the country.85 
Prior to election day 2013, the NCSW received complaints that women were be-
ing barred from voting in much of FATA.86 Militants distributed pamphlets in North 
Waziristan agency warning tribesmen against allowing women relatives to vote; in 
 
 
79 FATA has seven administrative units or agencies (Bajaur, Orazkai, Mohmand, Khyber, Kurram, 
North Waziristan and South Waziristan), and Tribal Areas, also known as Frontier Regions, adjoin-
ing KPK’s Peshawar, Kohat, Bannu, Dera Ismail Khan, Lakki and Tank districts. 
80 Crisis Group has called for FCR’s repeal. Crisis Group Reports, Reforming Pakistan’s Criminal 
Justice System; Countering Militancy in FATA; and The Militant Jihadi Challenge, all op. cit. 
81 KPK’s governor has executive authority over FATA as the president’s representative. Political 
Agents are federal bureaucrats. Crisis Group Report, Countering Militancy in FATA, op. cit.  
82 Article 247 (3): “No act of Parliament shall apply to FATA or any part thereof unless the presi-
dent so directs”. The president has discretion to issue regulations with respect to the “peace and 
good governance” of FATA; federal parliament laws only apply if the president so orders.  
83 “Poll doors closed on a third of FATA women”, Daily Times, 17 February 2008.  
84 “Elections 2008: Will Taliban get access to the parliament?”, Pakistan Institute for Peace Stud-
ies, 13 December 2007.  
85 “State of Human Rights in Pakistan 2013”, op. cit., p. 153.  
86 Khawar Mumtaz, NCSW chairperson, “Report on elections monitoring with recommendations”, 
23 June 2013.  
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the agency capital, Miramshah, clerics made similar announcements on mosques’ 
loudspeakers.87 In the run-up to the first party-based polls in the region, the eleven-
member Political Parties Joint Committee on FATA Reforms, including the PPP, 
ANP and PTI, recommended reserved National Assembly seats for FATA women and 
called on the ECP (Election Commission of Pakistan) to ensure that polling stations 
for women were set up in all FATA agencies and Frontier Regions. When, braving 
insurgent threats, women tried to vote in large numbers in Khyber agency, however, 
there were insufficient booths.88 
The right to vote and contest public office will translate into political empower-
ment of FATA women only if far more is done by the ECP to facilitate women voters 
and by the state to protect them, as well as women candidates and polling stations. 
The ECP should investigate all cases where women have been prevented from voting. 
In Bajaur agency, Badam Zari, an independent candidate and the first FATA woman 
to contest national elections,89 obtained only 142 of 185,040 votes, amid reports that 
local strongmen and clerics had dissuaded communities from voting for a woman and 
from letting women cast ballots. Only 2,890 of the 120,230 women on the agency’s 
electoral roll participated.90 
2. Political participation in KPK  
Women in KPK, unlike FATA, have constitutional freedoms and legal protections, 
though the Provincially Administered Tribal Areas (PATA) is something of an excep-
tion. PATA is subject to Pakistan’s basic criminal and civil law framework and is un-
der the jurisdiction of the provincial KPK legislature (and the National Assembly) 
and the Peshawar High and Supreme Courts. However, under Article 247 of the con-
stitution, laws apply there only if specifically extended by the governor (the federa-
tion’s representative), with presidential consent.91 
In PATA and the rest of KPK, violent extremists target women, whose rights are 
also under siege by Islamist parties. Most mainstream parties make little effort to 
advance political empowerment, particularly through the ballot box. In 2013, the 
number of women candidates to the KPK provincial assembly increased from eleven 
in 2008 to twenty-six. Yet, sixteen stood as independents, without party backing or 
financial and logistical support.92 Only five of eighteen women candidates for KPK’s 
National Assembly general seats had party backing. Even a woman such as Nusrat 
Begum, the first from Lower Dir district to contest a National Assembly seat and the 
district vice president of the PTI, the party that swept the KPK polls, was an independ-
ent candidate.93 Unsurprisingly, she and Musarrat Shaheen, a well-known Pashtun 
 
 
87 “Voices from FATA”, op. cit.; “Taliban, taboos bar millions of women from voting”, Agence France-
Presse, 25 April 2013. 
88 “Political parties campaign in historic FATA elections”, Political Parties Joint Committee on FATA 
Reforms, press release, 14 March 2013; “Voices from FATA”, op. cit.  
89 “Badam Zari vows to project soft image of tribal areas”, Dawn, 2 April 2013. 
90 “Final electoral rolls 2012 – voter stats district wise (FATA)”, ECP; “Voices from FATA”, op. cit.  
91 Crisis Group Report, Countering Militancy in PATA, op. cit.  
92 Maliha Zia, “2013 elections – women’s representation in legislatures”; Wasim Wagha, “Number 
of women candidates rises sharply in 2013 elections”, both in Legislative Watch, Aurat Publication 
and Information Service Foundation, newsletter no. 41, March-November 2013. 
93 “Two tribal women, Badam Zari and Nusrat Begum, out to make history”, Dawn, 1 April 2013. 
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actress who competed against JUI-F leader Maulana Fazlur Rahman, received less 
than 200 votes each.94 
In a number of polling stations, including in Upper and Lower Dir, Buner, Mar-
dan, Dera Ismail Khan, Nowshera, Batagram and Malakand districts, men from al-
most all parties agreed to bar women, including party supporters, from voting. Male 
provincial assembly candidates in Upper Dir agreed a signatory would be fined ten 
million rupees (some $100,000) to be paid to the jirga (council of elders) in case of 
non-compliance. Only one woman voted there and none in six polling stations in 
Lower Dir, where in that district’s Ouch union council, candidate Begum was the sole 
woman voter.95 A poll monitor said, “we alerted the ECP about women being barred 
from voting. Its provincial office wrote back saying it had conducted an inquiry in 
Lower Dir and found no evidence”.96  
After proof of similar agreements surfaced during by-elections, the Peshawar 
High Court demanded that the ECP withhold results where women’s vote was negli-
gible and recommended amendments to the Representation of the People Act 1976 to 
include punitive action against those responsible.97 The Supreme Court overturned 
this ruling, allowing the ECP to validate results.98  
Civil society activists have called for a minimum 10 per cent turnout of registered 
women voters to validate results in any constituency. KPK’s PCSW recommended to 
the ECP – so far unsuccessfully – that results in a constituency should be considered 
valid only if the turnout was at least 20 per cent female.99 A private member Nation-
al Assembly bill introduced in 2014 and pending would have the ECP annul elections 
in “any constituency [where] the women voters have been constrained by any means 
to cast their votes”.100 Though forcibly preventing women from voting is already a 
crime, and the ECP must act on credible evidence, parties have yet to move against 
candidates and supporters who entered into agreements to prevent women from vot-
ing, such as in Lower Dir district.101  
KPK women have braved threats to vote and stand for office, including Najma 
Hanif Jadoon, a human rights activist and ANP candidate for a reserved provincial 
assembly seat who was shot dead in Peshawar in August 2013.102 Ahead of that month’s 
by-elections in Hangu district, the Pakistani Taliban distributed pamphlets warning 
 
 
94 “All women candidates from KP lost elections by huge margins”, The News, 23 May 2013. 
95 Upper and Lower Dir belong to PATA. “GEM mission urges ECP to declare polls null, void”, Au-
rat Foundation’s Gender Election Monitoring Mission with Gender Concern International, Election 
Monitoring 2013, Aurat Foundation, 14 May 2013; “KP govt confirms women vote blocked by polit-
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women they would be kidnapped and killed if they voted or otherwise participated in 
the “current democratic system [that] clashes with Sharia”.103 But 44 per cent of eli-
gible women did vote, underscoring commitment to democracy in a region where the 
state has yet to provide security or justice.104  
B. Access to Justice in FATA and KPK 
Constitutionally guaranteed gender equality and pro-women legislation does not ex-
tend to FATA, nor does the reach of courts and police. Disputes involving women, 
generally considered private, rarely go outside the extended family or community 
and are settled according to discriminatory tribal customs (rewaj). Trials are con-
ducted by all-male jirgas, and a woman must be represented by a man.105 Jirgas 
have been known to treat women as commodities, including by ordering a woman 
relative of an accused male to be given in marriage to settle a feud, or a woman to be 
killed to preserve her male relatives’ honour.106 “While jirgas do not compensate 
women [for crimes against them], it is customary for someone accused of murder to 
have to leave the village, give up property and give a sister in marriage to a relative of 
the deceased”.107  
Women have limited legal recourse. Under the FCR, the political agent (PA) has 
appellate power over the jirgas he appoints, but tasked with maintaining order – 
rather than upholding rule of law – he has little incentive to oppose jirga decisions 
and protect women.108 Judicial oversight also is elusive. The 1997 FCR amendments 
empowered a commissioner appointed by KPK’s governor to revise a PA decision 
and allowed a final appeal to a FATA tribunal composed of KPK’s home, law and 
chief secretaries. Amendments in 2011 changed the tribunal’s composition to two 
retired senior bureaucrats and a lawyer.109  
A 2014 private member’s bill sought to repeal Article 247 (7) of the constitution, 
which “by ousting the jurisdiction of the Supreme Court and of a High Court … acts 
as a grave impediment in the way of the tribal people in securing their fundamental 
rights and thereby in their integration and mainstreaming”. In support of the bill, 
the Senate in October 2014 unanimously adopted a resolution to extend the higher 
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judiciary’s jurisdiction to FATA.110 The bill itself was unanimously approved by the 
Senate standing committee on law and justice on 20 February 2015, but pressure 
from the military, which resists extension of judicial and police jurisdiction over FATA, 
may delay a vote in the lower house of parliament.111  
Military-devised deals with militants have also adversely affected women’s security 
in KPK’s PATA. In April 2009, as part of a peace deal with the Taliban-allied Tehreek-
e-Nifaz-e-Shariat-e-Mohammadi (TNSM), the KPK government promulgated the Ni-
zam-e-Adl Regulations 2009, imposing Sharia in the region. Government-appointed 
judicial officers trained in Islamic law now preside over qazi (religious) courts.  
While protective legislation such as the Muslim Family Laws Ordinance no longer 
applies to PATA, the Hudood Ordinances still do.112 PATA’s Islamic legislation might 
appear to have given women some rights denied by customary law, such as over in-
heritance, but in the absence of codified Islamic law, qazi courts that have little un-
derstanding of or sympathy for women’s rights have broad interpretive powers.113 
Judges and lawyers are unclear what laws now apply, and filing of cases is more com-
plicated and expensive, further undermining women’s ability to seek legal redress.114 
Despite public opposition to Islamist militancy in Swat and neighbouring PATA dis-
tricts, and the 2009 military operation against the TNSM, the PTI-JI government in 
Peshawar, like its predecessor, is unlikely to repeal the Nizam-e-Adl. There, as else-
where, much also depends on whether the police are capable and willing to protect 
women.  
During his tenure, a former KPK police inspector general said, the police estab-
lished 65 women’s complaint centres in police stations and hospitals, with support 
from the German development organisation GIZ.115 The KPK government has set up 
105 women police desks in stations, in addition to “lady complaints units”, staffed by 
policewomen in three model stations, with plans to expand them to all seven model 
stations to be created under a 2013-2017 UK-funded (Aitebaar) program.116 Currently, 
only 300 women officers (few senior) serve in the 70,000-strong force in a socially 
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conservative region where survivors of gender-based violence are unlikely to seek 
help from male officers.117  
Women’s upward mobility is constrained by politicised appointments and inabil-
ity, due to family obligations or pressure, to attend mandatory and/or specialised 
training that requires distant travel for lengthy periods.118 Some women officers, the 
vast majority of whom are in lower ranks, may not even leave the station without male 
colleague approval. Policewomen are also often abuse victims.119 The KPK govern-
ment must hold perpetrators accountable, end politicisation of appointments and 
ensure that policewomen have the authority and resources to do their jobs.  
In 2013, the Peshawar High Court formed an exclusively female bench – the 
nation’s first.120 “We have separate courts for acid attacks; we should have similar 
arrangements for rape and honour killing cases, and set up mobile courts to increase 
the justice system’s proximity to women and its responsiveness to their needs”, a civil 
judge said.121 Yet, there is only one female prosecutor in KPK’s prosecution agencies.122 
Penal reform should also be prioritised, not just in KPK but also countrywide. While 
the total of women prisoners is relatively low – some 1,000 in 2014, with 121 in KPK 
– there is a general lack of health services and high risk of abuse.123 In 2014, KPK au-
thorities announced the intention to establish the province’s first separate jail for 
women.124 
Access to legal aid in KPK is gradually improving. The UNDP’s Strengthening Rule 
of Law in Malakand (2011-2017) program has conducted legal aid clinics in which 
women were 45 per cent of the more than 8,000 attendees. UNDP has also estab-
lished legal aid desks in Buner, Swat and Lower Dir districts that have received 188 
cases, 70 per cent from women.125 The UK’s Department for International Develop-
ment (DFID) gives legal aid to women prisoners.126 Former Supreme Court Justice 
Nasir Aslam Zahid, who established a Karachi-based legal aid NGO for women pris-
oners in 2004, has, with retired Justice Arif Khilji, set up a legal advisory call centre 
that provides free legal advice to callers nationwide.127 In 2013, Madadgaar, a help-
line headquartered in Karachi for “children and women suffering from violence, 
abuse and exploitation”, set up provincial headquarters in Peshawar and other pro-
vincial capitals.128 
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Social and cultural constraints may, however, prevent many women from access-
ing free legal advice, possibly a reason why some activists, such as Khwendo Jirga 
founder Tabassum Adnan, try to use more familiar local structures such as jirga’s, 
but restructured to address women’s needs.129 In January 2014, Adnan was invited 
to a regular jirga to help feuding families reach an alternative solution after she stopped 
a girl from being given away in swara. “We called our group a jirga so we would be 
taken seriously and accepted in men’s jirgas”, she said.130 KPK’s PCSW is piloting a 
women’s jirga as a referral system and alternate dispute-resolution mechanism.131  
Such well-meaning initiatives, though, may prove counterproductive, by legiti-
mising and reinforcing a parallel informal justice system responsible for perpetuat-
ing gender inequality. The women’s rights organisation Shirkat Gah, which has run 
“women friendly spaces” since 2011, including in Swat district, has a different approach. 
Instead of working with informal justice mechanisms, it intends to engage with state 
institutions such as the police to address gender-based violence, thus strengthening 
the link between the citizen and the state and contributing to community reconstruc-
tion and rehabilitation in conflict zones.132 
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V. Women and Armed Conflict 
A. Life in Conflict Zones 
Women have been badly hit by both militancy and heavy-handed military operations 
that have disrupted the peace, displaced communities and destroyed homes and live-
lihoods in FATA’s and KPK’s conflict zones. KPK’s Swat district is an example. Until 
dislodged by the 2009 offensive, the TNSM barred women from working and girls 
from attending schools and, on occasion, publicly flogged those who did not comply 
with its version of Sharia. On 9 October 2012, three years after the military claimed 
to have cleared Swat of militant groups, girl education activist Malala Yousafzai and 
two schoolmates survived an attack in the district’s largest city, Mingora. Still today, 
despite the military’s continued presence, standing up for women’s rights means risk-
ing one’s life.  
The state’s reliance on informal militias (lashkars) – renamed “peace commit-
tees” to avoid association with those run by militant outfits – also undermines the 
rule of law and human rights in PATA and FATA. Many are little more than criminal 
gangs, responsible for countless abuses, including killings, abductions and forced 
marriages.133 The head of an NGO that has researched the impact of conflict on 
women in Swat said, “women are just too afraid to talk”, unsurprising when the per-
petrators have state sanction.134 Attacks on women officials and NGO personnel – 
including teachers and health workers – happen regularly. On 5 July 2012, for ex-
ample, Farida Afridi, co-founder of an NGO working to promote women’s rights in 
FATA, was shot dead.135  
There is considerable physical, financial and emotional cost for women living in 
or fleeing conflict-affected regions. Conflict for many women means the loss of a fa-
ther, husband or son who has joined the militants, died in combat or “disappeared”– 
kidnapped for ransom or held in a military-run internment centre.136 With already 
scarce livelihoods worsening because of military operations or militant violence, 
many men have also left to work within the country or abroad, mainly the Middle 
East. The woman left behind is dependent on the extended family, but without a 
husband or a son to represent her, her needs, including healthcare and other neces-
sities, are often neglected. Moreover, “it is not uncommon for women in these situa-
tions to be sexually abused by male in-laws”.137  
Within FATA’s conflict zones, sexual violence is endemic, but, a donor representa-
tive said, “talking about sexual violence is taboo”.138 In 2011, Khwendo Kor, which 
has extensive experience working in FATA and KPK on female rights, published ac-
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counts by displaced women from FATA of sexual and other physical violence by mili-
tants and security officials.139 Armed conflict has contributed to men abusing or mur-
dering women relatives with impunity. “When a woman is killed, you can just blame 
it on the Taliban or the paramilitary depending on what side you’re on”, said a wom-
en’s rights activist and FATA researcher.140 
Militant violence and heavy-handed military operations have also undermined 
access to health care and education. There are anecdotal accounts of miscarriages and 
deliveries while fleeing armed conflict and of stress impacting lactation.141 Schools 
have been destroyed and teachers intimidated by extremists.142 Persistent insecurity 
and militant threats, particularly to women teachers and girls, have made parents 
reluctant to let daughters attend school.143  
Internally displaced persons (IDPs) by conflict are particularly vulnerable.144 Ex-
ploiting the physical and financial vulnerabilities of displaced families, criminal gangs 
traffic women, forcing them into prostitution.145 The extent is difficult to ascertain 
due to the absence of a formal law enforcement sector and the social acceptability of 
the sale or exchange of women by some communities.146 Relief to IDPs is also gender 
insensitive. There are almost two million IDPs from the worst-hit FATA agencies 
(North and South Waziristan and Khyber). More than 74 per cent of the nearly one 
million displaced in the ongoing military operation in North Waziristan are women 
and dependent children.147 Women IDPs find it particularly difficult to obtain assis-
tance, including food and health care. There are few women nurses and doctors and 
insufficient women relief workers; and aid distribution points are often in public 
spaces most women find difficult to access. Those in IDP camps even have limited 
access to toilets.148 
The military and civil bureaucracies restrict local and international NGOs’ access 
to FATA’s and PATA’s IDP-hosting areas, though they could fill gaps in the state’s 
help for displaced females. “A senior-ranking army officer said they have disallowed 
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NGOs because you don’t know who comes in the garb of NGOs”.149 Claiming there 
are no IDPs, only persons who will soon go home, the government created a Tempo-
rary Dislocated Persons (TDP) Support and Management Secretariat in July 2014. 
Headed by a general, tasked with overseeing response to North Waziristan’s IDPs 
and bypassing civilian disaster management entities, it has further increased military 
control of relief, which is being used as a counter-insurgency tool. Along with lifting 
all restrictions on local and international NGOs in IDP areas, the government should 
investigate allegations of discriminatory assistance to ensure that women have un-
impeded access. Aid to female heads of household, who are the most disadvantaged, 
should be prioritised.150 The international community, particularly the UN and do-
nor countries, should ensure that women’s needs are adequately assessed in relief 
and rehabilitation assistance to conflict-affected and internally displaced persons. 
B. Women, Peace and Security 
The lack of transparency in relief aid for IDPs is just one aspect of the military’s 
opaque counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism policy, which has swung since 2004 
between peace deals with violent extremists in FATA and PATA and indiscriminate 
force.151 Women, though among the main targets of militants’ efforts to impose ultra-
orthodox Islam, have been consistently excluded from military-led negotiations. 
Gender perspective is largely absent from state strategies to counter violent extremism 
more generally. The ANP vice president in KPK, Bushra Gohar, said, “anyone who 
takes up arms is considered a stakeholder [by the state]. There needs to be a para-
digm shift where we recognise that the primary stakeholders are those most affected 
by the conflict”.152 According to a Peshawar-based rights’ activist, “the move not to 
include women is intentional. It’s not because women have nothing to bring to the 
table or because they are not party to the conflict, but because they will bring ques-
tions to the table that will make all other stakeholders uncomfortable, such as rights 
violations”.153  
Pakistan has yet to go beyond endorsing UN Security Council Resolution 1325 
(2000), which reaffirmed “the importance of women in the prevention and resolu-
tion of conflicts and in peacebuilding” and stressed “the importance of their equal 
participation and full involvement in all efforts for the maintenance of peace and se-
curity, and the need to increase their role in decision-making with regard to conflict 
prevention and resolution”. The rationale, said a prominent women’s right advocate, 
is that it is merely in a law and order crisis, not armed conflict.154 Yet, Pakistan has 
ratified the CEDAW, which with the Beijing Declaration provides a framework for 
women’s role in peace and security initiatives, legally binding states to ensure their 
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“equal access to, and equal opportunities in, political and public life”. The Beijing 
Platform of Action calls for “increas[ing] the participation of women in conflict reso-
lution at decision-making levels and protect[ing] women living in situations of armed 
and other conflicts”.155 States must report on implementation of national action plans 
in their CEDAW reports.156  
Pakistan’s 1998 National Action Plan for Women identified the need to change 
the “status of tribal areas” and “to introduce and implement just laws”, so as to “pro-
tect the rights of women during sectarian, ethnic and political conflicts within the 
country”.157 The consultations of the PPP-led federal government (2008-2013) with 
civil society groups on revisions ended when the eighteenth constitutional amend-
ment devolved the powers and mandate of the federal women’s affairs ministry to the 
provinces, which have yet to follow up. 
The multi-donor-funded 2010 Post-Conflict Needs Assessment (PCNA) for FATA 
and KPK, outlining a ten-year peacebuilding strategy, identified women’s marginali-
sation as “critical” in understanding the “drivers of the crisis”. Calling for a rights-
based, inclusive approach to building and sustaining peace, it emphasised: “If only 
half the population enjoys basic freedoms and rights, conflict will endure”.158 Yet, 
meaningful reform remains absent, and the World Bank-administered Multi-Donor 
Trust Fund (MDTF), tasked with funding the strategy, has struggled to mainstream 
gender in its activities.159 The international community, particularly the UN and do-
nor countries, should continue to enhance support for developing gender-responsive 
policing and also ensure that women’s needs, rights and priorities are meaningfully 
addressed in all aid programing. 
Some local civil society efforts are being made. Amn-o-Nisa, a network of profes-
sional women founded in 2011, tries to promote tolerance and counter radicalisation.160 
Since end-2008, its founding organisation, PAIMAN Alumni Trust, has set up wom-
en and youth groups in KPK and all FATA agencies except North Waziristan to me-
diate property and family-feud disputes lest they escalate into conflict.161 The groups 
also aim to counter radicalisation within their communities by identifying and en-
gaging young people attracted to violent extremism.162 Nationally, however, women’s 
rights activists have yet to mobilise a collective or coordinated movement, comparable 
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to earlier campaigns against discriminatory laws, to monitor rights violations in con-
flict zones and to demand a voice in counter-insurgency/counter-terrorism policy.163  
The Colombo-based South Asians for Human Rights (SAHR), with members from 
Afghanistan, India, Bhutan, Maldives, Bangladesh, Nepal and Sri Lanka, as well as 
Pakistan, intends to form peace missions to meet with stakeholders in conflict-
affected areas.164 “We want to develop a women’s regional peace agenda so that we 
can engage in informed advocacy”, said a senior jurist, women’s rights advocate and 
SAHR chairperson.165 A regional civil society coalition formed in 2011, the Women’s 
Regional Network, joins female leaders and rights activists from Pakistan, Afghani-
stan and India to strengthen women’s security and promote participation in prevent-
ing and resolving conflict.166 “Women must be brought in not because they’re women, 
but because they have the relevant expertise”, said Asma Jahangir, the former UN 
Special Rapporteur on extrajudicial, summary or arbitrary executions.167 
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Group telephone interview, HRCP chair and WAF founding member Zohra Yusuf, 14 February 2015. 
164 SAHR, www.southasianrights.org, was set up in 2010.  
165 Crisis Group interview, Hina Jilani, Lahore, 12 February 2015. 
166 Crisis Group interviews, Kishwar Sultana, director, Insan Foundation, Islamabad, 25 November, 
and Bushra Gohar, ANP vice president in KPK, Islamabad, 1 December 2014.  
167 Crisis Group interview, Lahore, 13 February 2015. 
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VI. Conclusion 
In 2015 – the Beijing Fourth World Conference’s twentieth and UN Security Council 
Resolution 1325’s fifteenth anniversary – there is little to show that Pakistan is meet-
ing commitments such as those in its 2011 CEDAW report that “efforts are underway 
to … promote gender equality, curb violence against women and enact legislation to 
empower Pakistani women”.168 This implementation failure undermines political, 
economic and social development – all necessary to consolidate Pakistan’s still frag-
ile democracy. As security challenges grow, in the conflict zones in particular, silenc-
ing women makes peace and stability more elusive.  
Despite enhanced political participation of women and the passage of a number 
of helpful laws since the democratic transition began in 2008, much remains to be 
done. Nationwide, discriminatory legislation denies women constitutionally guaran-
teed equality and protections. Pakistan should repeal all such laws, including the 
Hudood Ordinances, to end the state-sanctioned gender discrimination that has un-
dermined women’s rights and security and fostered violence and intolerance. There 
is also dire need to repeal the FCR and extend constitutionally guaranteed freedoms 
to women in FATA, whose lives and livelihoods are gravely threatened by militant 
violence and disrupted by indiscriminate military operations. Since the eighteenth 
constitutional amendment has placed the onus on KPK and the other provinces to 
end legally enshrined gender-based discrimination, their governments should act to 
protect and advance women’s rights.  
The federal and provincial governments must ensure that women have access to a 
gender-responsive police and an accessible, impartial judiciary in order to mitigate 
the impact of violence and armed conflict. Women and women’s rights activists are 
determined, despite barriers and threats, to continue their struggle for political and 
economic empowerment. The government must hear their voices and incorporate 
them into policymaking, including counter-insurgency, which can only succeed when 
those most affected are at the heart of peacebuilding. 
Islamabad/Brussels, 8 April 2015  
 
 
 
 
168 “CEDAW: Consideration of reports submitted by States parties under article 18 of the Conven-
tion on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women: Fourth periodic reports of 
States parties. Pakistan”, 24 September 2011. 
Women, Violence and Conflict in Pakistan 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°265, 8 April 2015 Page 26 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix A: Map of Pakistan 
 
 
 
Women, Violence and Conflict in Pakistan 
Crisis Group Asia Report N°265, 8 April 2015 Page 27 
 
 
 
 
 
Appendix B: Glossary 
ANP – Awami National Party, a secular Pashtun-
dominated party, headed a coalition government 
in KPK with the PPP, 2008-2013. 
ECP – Election Commission of Pakistan, consti-
tutionally mandated to hold elections to national, 
provincial and local legislatures, prepare elec-
toral rolls for elections to the National Assembly, 
the lower house of parliament, and the four pro-
vincial assemblies and conduct indirect elections 
to the Senate, the upper house of parliament. 
FATA – Federally Administered Tribal Areas, 
comprising seven administrative districts, or 
agencies, and six Frontier Regions bordering on 
south-eastern Afghanistan. 
FCR – Frontier Crimes Regulations, a draconi-
an, colonial-era legal framework adopted in 1901 
and retained after independence to govern FATA. 
HRCP – The independent Human Rights Com-
mission of Pakistan. 
Hudood Ordinances – Passed by Zia-ul-Haq’s 
military regime on 16 February 1979 and still in 
force, prescribing punishments in accordance 
with orthodox Islamic law, including amputation 
of limbs, flogging, stoning and other forms of the 
death penalty for crimes ranging from theft, 
adultery and extramarital sexual intercourse 
(called fornication) to consumption of liquor.  
JI – Jamaat-Islami, currently a coalition partner 
in the KPK government.  
KPK – Khyber Pakhtunkhwa, formerly known as 
the Northwest Frontier Province (NWFP).  
NCSW – National Commission on the Status of 
Women, established by ordinance in 2000 
under the women development ministry; in 
2012, the National Commission on the Status  
of Women law strengthened its powers and 
autonomy.  
PATA – Provincially Administered Tribal Areas, 
which, along with two of its biggest districts, 
Chitral and Swat, includes Upper Dir, Lower Dir, 
Malakand, Shangla, parts of Kohistan district, 
the tribal area adjoining Mansehra district and 
the former state of Amb. 
PCSW – Provincial Commission on the Status 
of Women, established by provincial assem-
blies. 
PML-N – Pakistan Muslim League-Nawaz, led 
by Prime Minister Nawaz Sharif, currently head-
ing a majority government at the centre and in 
Punjab. 
PPP – Pakistan Peoples Party, founded by Zulf-
ikar Ali Bhutto in 1967. Since Benazir Bhutto’s 
December 2007 assassination, it is headed by 
her widower, former President Asif Ali Zardari, 
and son, Bilawal Bhutto Zardari. It led the coali-
tion government in the centre, 2008-2013, and 
is currently the largest opposition party in the 
National Assembly. It also heads the Sindh pro-
vincial government. 
PTI – Pakistan Tehreek-e-Insaf, founded by 
Imran Khan, currently heading the coalition 
government in Khyber Pakhtunkhwa with JI. 
Qanun-e-Shahadat – The Evidence Act, as 
amended by General Zia-ul-Haq’s regime in 
1984.  
Qazi court – Sharia (Islamic law) court.  
Qisas and Diyat – Retribution and monetary 
compensation, elements of Sharia (Islamic law) 
on murder.
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